Deep Fork Cyber · autonomous vulnerability discovery & remediation

Scanners hand you a list of maybes. CVE Monster hands you the exploit and the patch.

An engine that reads a codebase the way an attacker does — as a graph of reachable paths, not a pile of files — then proves what it finds by building a working exploit, and closes it by writing the fix.

Bounties awarded
49
Paid out
$24,888
Programs
16
Window
12 mo

The pipeline

Seven stages, one loop, no humans in the boring parts.

Each stage narrows the field and raises the burden of proof. What survives all seven is a vulnerability with a reproduction, an exploit, and a patch attached — which is why programs pay it out instead of arguing about it.

  1. 01Map

    Build a knowledge graph of the code

    The target is parsed into a graph: functions, call paths, data flow, trust boundaries, and the routes untrusted input can take to reach sensitive operations. Everything downstream queries this graph rather than grepping text, so the engine reasons about reachability instead of pattern-matching strings.

  2. 02Analyze

    Run in-house AI static analysis

    Our own AI-powered SAST runs against the graph — tuned for the bug classes that actually get paid: memory corruption, type confusion, injection, path traversal, SSRF, authorization gaps. It reads context the way a reviewer does, so it flags the dangerous call that looks safe and skips the scary-looking one that isn't reachable.

  3. 03Fuzz

    Fuzz the paths worth fuzzing

    Coverage-guided fuzzing, aimed by the graph instead of thrown at the whole binary. Parsers, decoders, and protocol handlers get hammered where the analysis says input can actually arrive — which is how you find the memory-safety bugs static analysis argues about and humans never reach by hand.

  4. 04Swarm

    Turn agent swarms loose on the code

    Swarms of LLM-powered agents work the target in parallel, each chasing its own hypothesis about how the code breaks. They argue with the graph, with the fuzzer's crashes, and with each other. Breadth no single reviewer can match, running continuously rather than for the length of an engagement.

  5. 05Prove

    Build the end-to-end exploit

    A candidate is not a finding until it runs. Each one gets a working end-to-end exploit and a test case that fails against the vulnerable build and passes against the fixed one. This is the stage that kills the false positives every other tool forwards to your inbox.

  6. 06Patch

    Write the fix, not just the complaint

    The engine authors a patch against the real defect — informed by the same graph that found it, so the fix closes the reachable path instead of papering over the symptom. Finding a bug creates work for the maintainer. Finding it with the patch removes it.

  7. 07Report

    Submit, then retest

    Findings go to the program with a reproduction, the exploit, and the patch in one package. When the fix lands we retest against the original case to confirm it actually closed — and feed the result back into stage 01, where the graph learns what shipped.

The record

Paid out by 16 programs in 12 months.

Bounties awarded to the engine's findings between July 2025 and July 2026. Bounty programs do not pay for theory — every dollar below is a vulnerability that a vendor's security team confirmed, accepted, and fixed.

ProgramAwardsPaid
Mapbox26$12,350
Vercel5$3,550
Elastic1$2,368
Bitwarden2$1,220
Tor Project2$1,000
Lightspark1$750
WordPress1$600
Brave Software3$600
RudderStack1$500
Tools for Humanity1$500
Zipline International1$500
Ory Corp1$350
Buildkite1$200
Coinbase1$200
Clerk1$150
BrowserStack1$50
Total49$24,888

Browsers, geospatial SDKs, password managers, CI systems, identity providers, an anonymity network, and a crypto exchange. The engine is not tuned to one stack.

Point it at your code

Same engine. Your codebase. Before someone else looks.

CVE Monster is built and operated by Deep Fork Cyber — the security practice of Brian “geeknik” Carpenter, credited with hundreds of CVEs since 2016. One email reaches the researcher, not a sales team.

b@deepforkcyber.com